Abstract
Introduction
Gödel logics are one of the oldest and most interesting families of many-valued logics. Introduced by Gödel in [9] , they provide the first examples of intermediate logics (intermediate, that is, in strength between classical and intuitionistic logics). Dummett [7] was the first to study infinite valued Gödel logics, axiomatizing the set of tautologies over infinite truth-value sets by intuitionistic logic plus the linearity axiom´A Bµ ´B Aµ. In terms of Kripke semantics, the characteristic linearity axiom picks out those accessibility relations which are linear orders.
Gödel logics have recently received increasing attention, both in terms of foundational investigations and in terms of applications. One of the most surprising recent results is that whereas there is only one infinite-valued propositional Gödel logic, there are infinitely many different logics at the first-order and already when only "fuzzy quantifiers" are added to the language [3, 4] . In light of the fact that first-order infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic is not axiomatizable, it is perhaps also surprising that at least one infinite-valued Gödel logic is r.e. [10, 14] .
Our aim in the present paper is to characterize the axiomatizable first-order prenex Gödel logics, i.e., those truthvalue sets whose first-order validities in prenex form are r.e. This is a first step toward the characterization (in terms of axiomatizability) of first-order Gödel logics in general. Our result is that there is only one axiomatizable infinite-valued first-order prenex Gödel logic; it is characterized by any £ Research supported by FWF grant P15477-MAT closed uncountable subset of 0 1 . In fact, we give an axiomatization based on a version of Herbrand's theorem for such truth-value sets, and then show that any countably infinite truth-value set has a set of prenex validities which is not r.e.
Syntax and semantics
First-order Gödel logics are given by truth functions for the connectives and quantifiers, and a set of truth values. We work in a standard first-order language with variables (x, y, z, . . . ), constants (a, b, c, . . . ), function symbols ( f , g, . . . ), predicate symbols (P, Q, R, . . . ), the predicate constant , connectives ( , , ) and quantifiers ( , ) 
s can be extended in the obvious way to a function on all terms in L Á . The valuation of formulas in L Á is defined by: 
Relationships between Gödel logics
In the propositional case, the relationships between finite and infinite valued Gödel logics are well understood. Any choice of an infinite set of truth-values results in the same propositional Gödel logic, viz., Dummett's LC [7] . Furthermore, we know that LC is the intersection of all finite-valued propositional Gödel logics, and that it is axiomatized by intuitionistic propositional logic IPL plus the schema´A Bµ ´B Aµ. IPL is contained in all Gödel logics (finite-or infinite-valued).
In the first-order case, the relationships are somewhat more involved. First of all, let us note that Intuitionistic predicate logic IL is contained in all first-order Gödel logics, since the axioms and rules of IL are sound for the Gödel truth functions. As a consequence, we will be able to use any intuitionistically sound rules and intuitionistically valid formulas when working in any of the Gödel logics.
Proof. The only nontrivial part is proving that the containments are strict. For this note that´A 1 A 2 µ 
¾
The formulas C and C are of some importance in the study of first-order infinite-valued Gödel logics. C expresses the fact that every infimum in the set of truth values is a minimum, and C states that every supremum (except possibly 1) is a maximum. The only three quantifier shifting rules which are not intuitionistically valid are: 
One basic but important result is that the set of validities of G V only depends on the order type of V . Let V , V ¼ be two truth value sets, X a set of atomic formulas, and suppose there is an order-preserving injection f : Á´Bµ: B ¾ X V ¼ which is so that f´1µ 1 and f´0µ 0. 
Order theoretical preliminaries
We will characterize the axiomatizable Gödel logics by topological and order-theoretic properties of the underlying truth value set. The most important of these properties as regards axiomatizability is the existence of a non-trivial dense linear subordering of the truth value set, i.e., a subset
In this section we show that there is such a dense subordering iff V is uncountable.
Dense linear orderings are connected to uncountable sets via perfect sets. We begin by listing some results about perfect sets from [11] . All the following notations, lemmas, theorems are carried out within the framework of Polish spaces, i.e., separable completely metrizable topological spaces. For our discussion it is only necessary to know that any closed subset of Ê (and hence, any truth-value set) is such a Polish space. Definition 4.1 A limit point of a topological space is a point that is not isolated, i.e., for every open neighbourhood U of x there is a point y ¾ U with y x. A space is perfect if all its points are limit points.
It is obvious that intervals of the real line are perfect, but there are perfect sets which are not intervals:
Example 4.2 The set of all numbers in the unit interval which can be expressed in triadic notation using only 0 and 2 is called the Cantor set; it is a perfect subset of 0 1 .
Proposition 4.3 For any perfect set P Ê there is a unique partition of Ê into countably many intervals such that the intersection of P with each interval is either empty, the entire interval or isomorphic to the Cantor set.
Proof. See [15] , Proposition 1 and discussion.
¾
To obtain a connection between uncountable sets and perfect sets we first note that it is possible to embed the Cauchy space into any perfect space, which yields Lemma 4. 
For the other direction, we want to partition an uncountable set into a perfect kernel and a countable rest. This is the well known Cantor-Bendixon Theorem: Theorem 4.5 (Cantor-Bendixon) Let X be a Polish space. Then X P C, with P a perfect subset of X and C countable open. P is called the perfect kernel of X.
As a corollary we obtain that any uncountable Polish space contains a perfect set, and therefore has cardinality 2 ℵ 0 . Now we can prove the central theorem: We define a dense linear subordering for any uncountable set. In fact we will give a dense linear subordering of the perfect kernel.
Since every perfect subset of the real line is a union of intervals and sets isomorphic to the Cantor set (Proposition 4.3), it suffices to show the claim for those sets. For intervals the claim is trivial. Now consider the border points in a Cantor set, i.e., points which can only be approximated within the Cantor set from above or below but not both. In the ternary notation these are the points with a finite number of 0 or a finite number of 2, i.e., their ternary expansions are either a 0 a 1 a 2 a n or
between a k and a k·1 in the subset. Similarly for adjacent elements of a b-sequence. The set of border points is countable, therefore the set containing all the approximation sequences is countable and has all the necessary properties.
Note that for example 1/3 and 2/3 would not be in the dense linear subordering, because between them there is no point of the perfect set. We would replace 1/3 by a sequence of inner points approximating 1/3 from below and replace 2/3 by a sequence of inner points approximating 2/3 from above.
Axiomatizability results
Throughout this section, V is a truth value set which is either finite or uncountable. Let G V be a Gödel logic with such a truth value set. We show how to effectively associate with each prenex formula A a quantifier-free formula A £ which is valid in G V if and only if A is valid. The axiomatizability of G V then follows from the axiomatizability of LC (in the infinite-valued case) and propositional G m (in the finite-valued case). Recall that A H stands for the Herbrand normal form of A (see the proof of Theorem 3.2). Proof. We construct a "semantic tree" Ì; i.e., a systematic representation of all possible order types of interpretations of the atoms A i in the Herbrand base. Ì is a rooted tree whose nodes appear at levels. Each node at level is labelled with an -constraint.
Ì is constructed in levels as follows: At level 0, the root of Ì is labelled with the constraint . Let ν be a node added at level with label , and let T be the set of terms occurring in X . Let (*) be: There is an interpretation Á that fulfils so that for some -instance A´tµ, Á´A´tµµ 
¾
The following lemma establishes sufficient conditions for a logic to allow reverse Skolemization. By this we mean the re-introduction of quantifiers in Herbrand expansions. Here, by a logic L we mean a set of formulas that is closed under modus ponens, generalization and substitutions (of both formulas and terms). We call a formula A valid in L,
The following three results follow from (7) 
Theorem 5.9 The prenex fragment of a Gödel logic based on a truth value set V which is either finite or uncountable infinite is axiomatizable. An axiomatization is given by the standard axioms and rules for LC extended by conditions (4)-

¾ 6 Nonaxiomatizability results
In this section we show that the prenex fragments of firstorder Gödel logics where the set of truth values does not contain a dense subset are not axiomatizable. We establish the result first for the entire set of valid formulas by reducing the classical validity of a formula in all finite models to the validity of a formula in Gödel logic (the set of these formulas is not r.e. by Trakhtenbrot's Theorem). We then strengthen the result by showing that the image of the translation from the prenex fragment of classical logic to Gödel logic is equivalent to a prenex formula.
Theorem 6.1 If V is countably infinite, then G V is not axiomatizable.
Proof. By Theorem 4.6, V is countably infinite iff it is infinite and does not contain a non-trivial densely ordered subset. We show that for every sentence A there is a sentence A g s.t. A g is valid in G V iff A is true in every finite (classical) first-order structure.
We define A g as follows: Let P be a unary and L be a binary predicate symbol not occurring in A and let Q 1 , . . . , Q n be all the predicate symbols in A. We use the abbreviations x ¾ y L´x yµ and x y ´P´yµ P´xµµ P´yµ. Note that for any interpretation Á, Á´x ¾ yµ is either 0 or 1, and as long as Á´P´xµµ 1 for all x (in particular, if Á´ zP´zµµ 1), we have Á´x yµ 1 iff Á´P´xµµ Á´P´yµµ. Let 
where S is the conjunction of the standard axioms for 0, successor and , with double negations in front of atomic formulas,
and A ¼ is A where every atomic formula is replaced by its double negation, and all quantifiers are relativized to the predicate R´iµ
Intuitively, L is a predicate that divides a subset of the domain into levels, and x ¾ i means that x is an element of level i. P orders the elements of the domain which fall into one of the levels in a subordering of the truth values. The idea is that for any two elements in a level i there is an element in level i · 1 which lies strictly between those two elements in the ordering given by . If this condition cannot be satisfied, the levels above i are empty. Clearly, this condition can be satisfied in an interpretation Á only for finitely many levels if V does not contain a dense subset, since if more than finitely many levels are non-empty, then Ë i Á´P´dµµ : Á d ¾ i gives a dense subset. By relativizing the quantifiers in A to the indices of non-empty levels, we in effect relativize to a finite subset of the domain. We make this more precise:
Suppose A is classically false in some finite structure Á.
W.l.o.g. we may assume that the domain of this structure is the naturals 0, . . . , n. We extend Á to a G V -interpretation Á g with domain AE as follows: Since V contains infinitely many values, we can choose c 1 , c 2 , L and P so that x´x ¾ iµ is true for i 0, . . . , n and false otherwise, and so that sup Distr Á g P´xµ 1. The number-theoretic symbols receive their natural interpretation. for all x, y, j, and k. Now suppose that for all z, Á´Kµ 1, yet Á´ zKµ 1. Then for at least some z the value of that formula would have to be sup Distr Á P´zµ, which is impossible. Thus, for every x, y, j, k, there is a z such that Á´Kµ 1. But this means that for all x, y s.t. x ¾ j, y ¾ k with j k i and x y there is a z with x z y and z ¾ i·1.
In the second case, where Á´ x ´x ¾ iµµ 1, we have that Á´ ´x ¾ iµµ 1 for all x, hence Á´x ¾ iµ 0 and level i is empty.
Since V contains no dense subset, from some finite level i onward, the levels must be empty. Of course, i 0 since 
Conclusion
Our characterization relates in an interesting way to compactness results of entailment relations of Gödel logics as given in [5] : Exactly those Gödel logics have an axiomatizable prenex fragment which also have a compact propositional logic.
For full first order Gödel logics the situation is quite similar in the sense that the truth value set must be finite or uncountable to allow axiomatization, but in addition it is necessary that 0 either be in the perfect kernel of the truth value set or be isolated. Two different logics correspond to these conditions, which have the same prenex fragment. Consequently there are Gödel logics where the prenex fragment is axiomatizable, but the full logic does not allow a recursive axiomatization. These are the logics of truth value sets which contain an uncountable subset, but 0 is neither in the perfect kernel nor isolated. These results have been obtained in [12] and will be reported in a forthcoming article by the authors.
